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World Oil:  Market or Mayhem? 
Introduction 
 The oil market has often excited and sometimes perplexed its many participants 
and observers.  A list of the presently baffled would include investors, merchants, 
politicians, regulators, economists, analysts, and just plain folks.  This is not so hard to 
fathom.  We have moved beyond oil’s golden era, that hundred-year stretch between 
1874 and 1973 when the real price was relatively stable and mostly stayed within the 
range from $10 to $20 per barrel.1  That epoch has ended and been replaced by something 
entirely different, something that to many observers looks like chaos.   
The old regime began to crumble in 1973, when certain politically-motivated 
major producing nations declared an embargo on oil exports to the U.S.  That spooked 
the market and caused prices to triple from $15.42 to $48.92 within one year.  Later in the 
decade, political and military strife in the Middle East again rattled the market and caused 
a further doubling, although prices eventually fell back to earth with a loud thud, 
bottoming out at $27.22 per barrel in April 1986.  Recent developments seem even more 
remarkable.  After skidding to a low of $17 per barrel in 1998 in the wake of the Asian 
financial crisis, oil stabilized around $30 during 2000-2004, but then began a 
breathtaking ascent that surpassed $140 by July, 2008.  Everyone repeats the same 
question:  What next?   
Because the world oil market is, ultimately, subject to the forces of supply and 
demand, and because most participants are motivated to some extent by profit, it is not 
unreasonable to believe that application of basic economic principles may help to 
                                                 
1 All prices in this section are stated in terms of 2007 US dollars, as reported by BP (2008). 
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organize the data, concentrate thought, and strengthen our understanding of these events.  
However modest it may seem, such is the purpose of this essay:  to see whether economic 
theory can help to illuminate recent developments in the world oil market.  Taking the 
next step (what next?) represents a higher aspiration, but one that still must be as 
amenable to economic analysis as to other forms of punditry.  Keep in mind, however, 
that whereas economics may help to clarify certain aspects of the petroleum story, 
economists have not the power to eliminate uncertainty regarding exogenous events.  It 
should be enough to satisfy most readers if, by taking an economic perspective, we are 
able to distinguish sources of fundamental uncertainty regarding the future of world oil 
from the fog that descends from confused thought.   
Some Background 
It is no exaggeration to say that a unique combination of economic circumstances 
and policy issues surrounds oil.  A short list would include the prominent role and 
unusual longevity of a major cartel (OPEC); nagging doubts about the sustainability of 
the natural resource base and concerns about “peak oil;” extremely high price volatility 
compared to other commodities; the absolute size and scope of the oil industry and its 
historical link to industrialization, economic growth, and the global distribution of 
wealth; the substantial volumes of petroleum-related CO2 emissions that place oil near 
the epicenter of the global warming debate; plus a host of tricky geopolitical issues that 
reflect the uneven distribution of oil deposits around the globe.   
The oil industry is both large and international, which means nearly all nations are 
significantly impacted by market developments.  At least fifty countries produce 
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substantial volumes of oil, and two-thirds of total production is exported.2  Countries of 
the Middle East, the Former Soviet Union, and Africa account for the bulk of exports, 
whereas the U.S., Europe, China, and Japan account for nearly all of the imports, as 
recorded in Figure 1.  There are many grades of crude oil, but they all compete in a 
highly integrated world marketplace with price differentials that reflect the relative 
desirability of grades.  It costs only a dollar or two to shift a barrel from Europe to the 
U.S., or from the Middle East to the Far East, so arbitrageurs are active and keep relative 
prices in line. 
Figure 1:  2006 Net Oil Imports, by Region 
(Crude Oil & Refined Products, Million Barrels per Day)
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For many years, oil exports (crude oil plus refined products) have been the 
leading commodity in world trade—lately comprising 13% of total commodity trade by 
value, some $4 billion per day.3  In comparison, automobile exports amount to only about 
one-third as much, and iron and steel even less.  Chemicals are the only category that 
comes close, at five-sixths the value of oil (see Figure 2).  These statistics are for 2006, 
the most recent year available.  Since then, the relative value of oil exports has increased. 
 
                                                 
2 Oil production, imports, and exports are from BP (2008). 
3 All trade statistics reported here are derived from UN (2006).  
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Figure 2:  Global Imports, 2006
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It is also true that the world oil market has undergone fundamental change during 
our lifetime, and that adherence to old conceptions has tended to confuse the analysis and 
taint public discourse.  Although contradicted by facts, the historical presumption that 
world oil is dominated by a handful of private corporations (the so-called “Seven 
Sisters”) who manipulate the market has been slow to die.  In 1969, before a wave of 
nationalizations reshaped the industry, the eight largest oil companies produced 89% of 
the world’s oil; today, those same companies account for only 12% of production.4  
Perhaps more significantly, they now control only 3% of the world’s remaining proved 
oil reserves.  Production is still highly concentrated, but market power has passed into 
new hands.  “Big Oil” now consists of the state-owned companies of the major exporting 
nations, who account for about 50% of global output, control 70% of recoverable 
reserves, and operate under sovereign power beyond the reach of anti-trust or regulatory 
authorities.  Some of these national oil companies are affiliated with OPEC, some are not. 
                                                 
4 The original eight included Esso, BP, Shell, Gulf, Texaco, SoCal, Mobil, and CFP.  With the exception of 
CFP, these were the “Seven Sisters.”  Through various mergers and consolidation, the eight have been 
reduced to five, now know as the “super majors”: ExxonMobil, BP, Shell, Chevron, and Total.  The 1969 
shares are from Adelman (1972); current shares are from Petroleum Intelligence Weekly (2007). 
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 In these few pages we cannot provide a comprehensive review of the world oil 
market.  Fortunately, excellent and more detailed analyses are available.5  Our goal is to 
examine just a few key questions that have sparked recent controversy and debate:   
 Why are oil prices so volatile? 
 What is OPEC and what does OPEC do? 
 What is the equilibrium price of oil? 
 Is “peak oil” a genuine concern? 
 Why did oil prices spike in 2008, and what role (if any) did speculators play? 
Any attempt to answers these questions must be informed and disciplined by economics.  
No amount of political theory, geology, or engineering can substitute for the basic 
principles of supply and demand—no matter how hard some people may try.  
Oil Price Volatility 
 Volatility is a composite measure of the size and frequency of price movements.  
It is convenient to think of price changes in terms of percentages.  If we denote by x the 
percentage change from one year to the next, i.e., xt = (pt-pt-1)/pt-1, it follows that xt  
ln(1+xt) = ln(pt/pt-1), which is the usual formula by which the relative price change (or 
“return” as it is called in the finance literature) is computed.  Annual volatility is simply 
the standard deviation of annual returns over a series of years: 
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5 Adelman (1972) produced the first comprehensive study of the modern oil market, albeit just before 
OPEC took center stage.  Important and more recent works include Adelman (1993, 1995, and 2002), 
Adelman and Watkins (2008), Bentzen (2007), Chapman and Khanna (2006), Chen and Chen (2007), 
Elekdag, et. al. (2008), Griffin and Xiong (1997), Hartschorn (1993), IEA (2005), Kaufman, et. al. (2004), 
Killian et. al. (2007), Nordhaus (2007), Parra (2004), Smith (2005), and Weiner (2006).   
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Intuitively, volatility represents the range of movement (percentage up or down) that 
could reasonably be expected to occur during the year.  If we assume that returns follow a 
normal distribution, this can be made more precise:  the chance of a fluctuation beyond 
one standard deviation (i.e., the stated volatility) over the course of a year is determined 
(from the z-table) to be roughly 1-in-3.   
 The volatility of crude oil prices is high:  31% when measured using annual 
returns over the “modern” era, 1974-2007.6  Regnier (2007), who provides volatility 
estimates for many products, finds that oil is more volatile than 95% of all products sold 
in the U.S.  Moreover, oil is more volatile now than before; having averaged only 20% 
during the previous century (1874-1973).7  Natural gas—which is traded in separate 
markets not subject to manipulation by OPEC or fears of reaching peak production—
exhibits even greater volatility than oil, 41% measured over the 1995-2008 interval.8   
 What creates high volatility, for both oil and gas, is the inelasticity of demand and 
supply, plus the substantial lead times required to efficiently alter the stock of fuel-
consuming equipment, or to augment the productive capacity of oil and gas fields.  
Volatility provides incentives for holding large inventories, but since inventories are 
costly, they cannot fully offset the rigidity of demand and supply.  Empirical estimates of 
the price elasticity of demand for crude oil vary by place, time, and statistical technique.  
Estimates of -0.05 (short-run) and -0.35 (long-run) are typical, with several years 
required to complete the adjustment to a permanent price change.9   
                                                 
6 Author’s calculation based on the annual oil price data in BP (2008). 
7 Author’s calculation based on the annual oil price data in BP (2008). 
8 Author’s calculation based on monthly Nymex futures prices, as reported by the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration.  Oil and gas are not perfectly substitutable, and their prices are therefore imperfectly 
correlated.  The simple correlation has averaged 85% since 1995. 
9 See, for example, Gately and Huntington (2002), Cooper (2003), and EIA (2003). 
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 Income elasticities of demand for crude oil appear to vary significantly by level of 
income, with near proportional growth in oil demand in many developing countries (I ≈ 
1.00), but much slower growth in the industrialized world (I ≈ 0.50).10  It follows that 
future growth of demand for oil, and therefore the equilibrium price level, hinges on 
economic growth rates in China, India, etc. 
It is more difficult to produce current and reliable estimates of the elasticity of 
crude oil supply, due in part to confounding effects of resource depletion and technical 
innovation, but there is consensus that the supply of conventional oil is inelastic.  The 
U.S. Energy Information Administration uses elasticities of 0.02 (short-run) and 0.10 
(long-run) for most regions in its international oil supply model.11  At current price levels, 
unconventional oil resources are becoming an effective substitute for conventional oil, 
and therefore helping to make supply more elastic, at least in the long-run.12   
 Despite the rigidity and lags, there would be no volatility absent shocks to crude 
oil demand and supply.  Shocks, which are indeed plentiful, trigger price adjustments that 
restore balance between supply and demand.  Weather-related shocks affect demand and 
often disrupt supplies.  Political disruptions, and threats (real or imagined) of military 
incursions and terrorist action also have an impact.  These factors are compounded by the 
bumpy path of economic growth and occasionally by unexpected technical breakthroughs 
or breakdowns—which produce a continual series of price corrections that are magnified 
to the extent that both supply and demand are inelastic. 
                                                 
10 Gately and Huntington (2002). 
11 Personal communication from George Butler, EIA, and Table Omsecon2.b04 of the EIA’s International 
Energy Module documentation, National Energy Modelling System, 2003. 
12 Unconventional oil consists of alternative hydrocarbon resources (e.g., shale) that require different 
technologies for their exploitation). 
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Consider, for example, BP’s forced closure (due to corrosion problems) of the 
Alaskan Prudhoe Bay field (the largest oil field in the United States), which unexpectedly 
removed 400,000 barrels per day (0.47%) of total world supply for an indefinite period in 
2006.  If the entire adjustment to restore equilibrium were to have come from the demand 
side, and given a short-run elasticity of -0.05, then the price would have jumped by some 
9.4% (=-0.0047/0.05).  In fact, the price rose by just 3% (from $74.78 to $77.05 per 
barrel) during the first trading session after the closure.13  The difference confirms the 
importance of inventory adjustments and induced production increases elsewhere in 
offsetting the impact of supply disruptions.   
 The demand for crude oil is a derived demand that stems from the demand for 
gasoline, jet fuel, heating oil, etc.  The lack of good substitutes creates inelastic demand 
for motor fuels, and therefore contributes to the inelasticity of demand for crude oil.  So 
too does the proclivity of many developing nations to subsidize the retail price of refined 
petroleum products.  Millions of consumers in China, India, Thailand, Malaysia, Sri 
Lanka, Taiwan, Venezuela, etc. enjoyed subsidies which shielded them from part of the 
steep increase in the price of crude oil that occurred during 2006-2008.14  The impact of 
price caps and subsidies is to reduce the elasticity of demand for crude oil.  Ironically, 
large excise taxes levied on consumption of refined products in Europe and elsewhere 
have much the same effect:  the pass-through of increased crude oil cost is dampened in 
percentage terms by the presence of the tax, and the elasticity of demand for crude oil is 
reduced—at least if the tax remains fixed.  The demand response would be diminished 
further if proposals (floated during the recent U.S. Presidential campaign) to reduce 
                                                 
13 The closure was announced early on Monday, August 7.  We compute the impact using spot prices of 
WTI on Friday, August 4 and Monday, August 7, as reported by the EIA. 
14 The Economist (2008a). 
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motor fuel taxes to relieve consumers of the burden created by higher crude oil costs 
were adopted.   
Because crude oil is priced in US dollars, a weaker dollar makes oil cheaper for 
most of the world’s consumers.  If care is not taken with the data, currency fluctuations 
may obscure the true elasticity of demand, especially when exchange rates move with the 
price of oil, as they have done lately (see Figure 3).  Consider, for example, that the price 
of oil rose by 11% in dollar terms (from $64.99 to 72.36) between August 2005 and 
August 2007.  However, because the Euro rose in value over this period (from $1.2195 to 
$1.3682), the effective price of oil to European consumers actually fell by 1% (from 
€53.29 to €52.89).15  Likewise, when the dollar price of oil fell 22% from its peak 
between July 3 and August 15, 2008, the value of the Euro also fell (from $1.5708 to 
$1.4695), so the effective price reduction was only 17% from the European perspective.  
In recently years, currency fluctuations have dampened oil price movements for most 
consumers outside the U.S.  Their muted reaction to changes in the quoted price of oil 
does not mean they are less sensitive to changes in the price of oil.  
Figure 3:  A Weaker Dollar Cushions the Rise in Oil
(monthly data)
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15 These are spot prices for WTI, as reported by the EIA.  Exchange rate are from the US Federal Reserve 
Board of Governors historical data base. 
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OPEC 
 It is impossible to discuss the world oil market without mentioning the influence 
of OPEC, a cartel that includes eleven of the fifteen largest oil-exporting countries in the 
world.16  This cartel, which controls 70% of global oil reserves, is actively managed by 
its members who meet regularly to “coordinate their oil production policies in order to 
help stabilize the oil market and to help oil producers achieve a reasonable rate of return 
on their investments.”17  In other words, OPEC’s goal is to set the price.18 
 Because much has been written elsewhere about OPEC, we restrict our focus to 
the two major pieces of OPEC’s strategy for “stabilizing” prices:  (1) shutting in existing 
production capacity, and (2) limiting the growth of new capacity.  OPEC has mostly 
failed at the former, but succeeded at the latter.  Perhaps surprisingly, consumers have 
suffered from OPEC’s failure as well as its success.  Mismanagement of shut-in capacity 
has contributed significantly to the volatility of prices, as in 1997 when OPEC famously 
mistimed quota adjustments just before the Asian financial crisis.  Limiting the growth of 
new capacity, on the other hand, has definitely driven up the average price level.  OPEC 
has created both instability and higher prices. 
 At first glance, OPEC’s track record for withholding production appears 
successful (see Figure 4).  After gaining control of production in 1973, OPEC recorded a 
quick success by threatening an embargo and cutting output.  Shut-in capacity nearly 
                                                 
16 These eleven include (listed by decreasing export volume):  Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran, Kuwait, 
Venezuela, Nigeria, Algeria, Libya, Iraq, Angola, and Qatar.  Export volumes (2006) are from the EIA 
database:  http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/index.cfm.  OPEC’s twelfth member, Ecuador, produces and 
exports relatively little crude oil.  Indonesia, formerly a prominent member of OPEC, announced its 
intention to suspend membership during 2008 since its production has declined and it is no longer a net 
exporter of oil. 
17 For more of OPEC’s own statement of intents and purposes, see http://www.opec.org/aboutus/. 
18 Smith (2005) showed that monthly output changes by OPEC members are synchronized to an extent that 
is inconsistent with non-collusive behavior. 
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tripled between 1973 and 1975—and the real price of oil nearly tripled as well.19  That 
action was not sustained, however, and prices began to retreat.  Since that early episode, 
there has been no comparable demonstration of OPEC’s ability to hold production off the 
market.  The period from 1979 to 1983 (the only other time that prices and shut-in 
capacity both rose sharply) might seem to qualify, but those events were not the 
purposeful result of OPEC’s strategy.  Rather, they were caused by the Iranian revolution 
and the outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq, which disrupted operations and kept 
nearly 6 mmb/d off the market.20  Readers with a sense of history will recognize that 
much of the cartel’s “shut-in capacity” has resulted involuntarily from extraneous 
developments.  One does not refer to war, international sanctions, labor strife, or sabotage 
as serendipitous events—but these have all delivered important, unsought benefits to 
OPEC.   
Figure 4:  OPEC:  Shut-In Capacity
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19 Estimated excess production capacity of OPEC members is available from EIA (2008b, Table 3c). 
20 War-related disruptions shut in roughly 15% of OPEC’s production capacity.   
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 OPEC’s struggle with excess production capacity is reflected in the members’ 
lack of compliance with assigned production quotas, which is consistent with economists’ 
understanding of the free-rider problem.  Since the quota system was adopted in 1983, 
total OPEC production has exceeded the ceiling by 4% on average, but on numerous 
occasions the excess has run to 15% or more (see Figure 5).21  In general, full compliance 
has been achieved only during episodes, like the present, when members have not had 
enough installed capacity to exceed their quotas; i.e., when it has been physically 
impossible to cheat on their production limits.   
Figure 5:  OPEC Production Compliance
(Monthly Data)
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 Price-fixing, according to Professor Adelman, is like singing and mountain 
climbing:  easier to go up than come down.”22  OPEC has learned this lesson the hard 
                                                 
21 Quota data are from OPEC (2008a).  Actual production figures are from EIA (2008a).  In both cases, 
volumes of lease condensate and natural gas liquids, which are produced in conjunction with oil but not 
subject to the quotas, have been excluded.  
22 Adelman (2002, p. 187). 
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way and therefore adopted a conservative approach towards formation of new capacity, 
knowing that once it is built it is likely to used, whether or not to the cartel’s advantage.  
Better that demand outrun supply than supply outrun demand because the latter exposes 
OPEC’s weakness:  managing excess capacity. 
 OPEC’s crude oil production capacity (33 mmb/d) is virtually unchanged from 
1973, although the volume of proved reserves (i.e., known deposits that could have been 
tapped to expand capacity) doubled over that span.23  OPEC’s installed capacity is 
sufficient to extract just 1.5% of its proved reserves per year, which is another way of 
measuring the low intensity of development.  On the other hand, non-OPEC producers, 
working mostly in less prolific and more expensive petroleum provinces, have increased 
their production capacity by 69% since 1973, and installed sufficient facilities to extract 
5.6% of their proved reserves each year.24  OPEC accounted for only 10% of the 
petroleum industry’s upstream capital investment during the past decade, although it 
produced nearly half of global output.25  By holding back, OPEC has effectively allowed 
secular growth in demand to absorb and eliminate its surplus capacity, although ceding 
market share to non-OPEC producers in the process.  It appears that the risk of expanding 
low-cost capacity within OPEC exceeded the perceived harm from expansion of high-
cost capacity outside the cartel.   
 OPEC has recently initiated numerous projects to tap their under-developed 
reserves and finally expand capacity.  $40 billion per year is budgeted for this going 
                                                 
23 Production capacity data are estimates from EIA.  Proved reserves are from BP (2008). 
24 BP (2008).  To ensure comparability with OPEC’s conventional crude oil reserves, we have excluded 
Canadian tar sands reserves from this calculation. 
25 Investment figures are OPEC estimates, reported by Sandrea (2006).  Production share is based on BP 
(2008). 
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forward.26  The significance of that effort, however, can only be seen in perspective.  In 
2007, the five largest international oil companies (the super-majors), who collectively 
own just 3% of global oil reserves, spent about $75 billion to develop new production 
capacity.27  OPEC, with about twenty times the reserves, spends only about half as much 
in absolute terms.  OPEC restraint is also reflected in the upstream plowback rate:  in 
2007, the super-majors reinvested 25% of their gross production revenues to expand 
capacity, whereas OPEC members are investing only about 6% of their net export 
revenues on such projects.28 
The Equilibrium Price of Oil 
Various models of the world oil market have been advanced in the attempt to 
identify the equilibrium price of oil.29  They tend to have complex structures that are 
disaggregated by geographic region, industrial sector, and they usually incorporate 
various hypotheses regarding the behavior of OPEC members.  A basic insight can be 
obtained with less complication from a very simple model that regards Saudi Arabia as a 
Stackelberg leader—a producer  who anticipates the reaction of consumers and all other 
(price-taking) producers, and who sets its own output (and price) accordingly.  In such a 
model, the residual demand for Saudi oil is given by: 
     PQPQPQ SROWDWDSA   
where superscripts designate demand and supply and subscripts denote the disaggregation 
                                                 
26  $160 billion is expected to be spent on upstream projects within OPEC between 2008 and 2012, 
according to OPEC (2008b, p. 5). 
27 Investment expenditures as reported in corporate annual reports.  
28 Gross production revenue as reported in corporate annual reports.  OPEC members export three-fourths 
of their gross crude oil production.  The U.S. EIA estimates OPEC net oil export revenues on a monthly 
basis (http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/OPEC_Revenues/Factsheet.html). 
29 For example, Eckbo (1976), Horn (2004), Gately (2007), and Al-Qahtani, et. al. (2008). 
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of world (W) demand into the portion available to Saudi Arabia (SA) after allowing for oil 
produced by the rest of the world (ROW).  After differentiating with respect to price (P) 
and some manipulation, we can infer the elasticity of demand for Saudi crude oil: 
 


 1
S
ROW
D
WD
SA , 
where  represents Saudi market share.  If the Saudis are maximizing profits, we expect 
MRSA = MCSA, but since MR = P(1+1/), the marginal cost of Saudi production would 
then be P(1+1/ DSA ).   
Using the estimated parameter values introduced earlier (and subject to the many 
oversimplifications of this model), we can test whether the current price of $115 per 
barrel (as this is being written) satisfies the requirements for equilibrium.  We let DW  = -
0.35, SROW  = +0.10, and  = 12% (which is the Saudis’ current market share).  Thus, 
D
SA = -3.65, and since P = $115 we have MRSA = $83.49 per barrel.  The International 
Energy Agency (and most other analysts) estimate the marginal cost of Saudi oil to be 
much lower, in the range of $5 to $15 per barrel,30 which implies that the Saudis would 
benefit by reducing price and increasing production.  Reduce price by how much?  Our 
simplified model does not provide an answer, but Al-Qhatani, et. al. (2008) have built a 
more detailed and realistic model of this type, using data provided by Aramco (the Saudi 
national oil company) and other sources, and found the optimal Saudi price under a range 
of assumptions regarding market structure to be $40 per barrel or less.31 
                                                 
30 IEA (2005), Adelman and Watkins (2008). 
31 The calculations of Al-Qhatani, et. al. are calibrated to 2004 data.  Subsequent changes in costs and 
capacities would cause the results to vary, but not in dramatic fashion. 
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What this type of static, one-period analysis leaves out is the impact of depletion 
on future production and profits.  Because Saudi oil reserves are limited, what is 
produced today cannot be produced tomorrow.  Thus, to maximize the present value of 
the profit stream, it is necessary to schedule production such that the present value of 
marginal revenue from current and future outputs are the same. 
If we assume the relevant discount rate is 10%, we can test the price by 
comparing production twenty years ahead with production today.32  Marginal revenue 
today is $83.49, so if it does not rise to at least $561.70 in twenty years time,33 the Saudis 
would profit by shifting production to the present.  Since MR  P (always), this means 
current Saudi production could only be optimal (in the profit-maximizing sense) if the 
real price of oil were also expected to reach at least $561.70 per barrel within twenty 
years.  Given the wide array of alternative energy resources available at substantially 
lower cost, this seems doubtful.34   
This simple exercise strongly suggests that oil is overpriced at present, at least 
from the Saudi perspective.  Put differently, at this price level, the Saudis will run out of 
customers before they run out of oil.  By reducing price, they can avoid this.  Although 
our analysis is oversimplified, more detailed and realistic analyses of the inter-temporal 
optimization problem facing Saudi Arabia come to essentially the same conclusion.  See, 
for example, Horn (2004) and Gately (2007). 
Readers may ask where burgeoning Chinese demand for oil fits into this picture.  
The quick answer is to say that many alternative energy sources will be made available at 
                                                 
32 Adelman (1993, p. 461) estimates the real discount rate of OPEC producers to be even higher than 10%, 
which strengthens our argument.  
33 $561.70 = 83.491.1020 
34 IEA (2005, Figure ES-1, p. 17), and Aguilera, et. al. (2008). 
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costs below the equivalent of $561 per barrel to satisfy that demand—and that the high 
price of oil will itself cool the torrid pace of growth.  There is something to be learned, 
however, by considering in more detail the economic process by which a free market 
manages the depletion of a fixed resource against growing demand.  This type of question 
was first considered by Hotelling (1931), but for ease of exposition we present a 
simplified version of Hotelling’s analysis, as formulated by Herfindahl (1967). 
There are two conditions that an inter-temporal equilibrium must meet.  First, 
total consumption must not exceed the fixed amount of supply.  Second, the net price of 
the resource (“mineral rent”) must grow at the risk-adjusted discount rate, else there 
would be incentives for producers to reschedule production:   
  SPQT
t
t
D
t 
0
 
    1T...,,0tforCPr1CP t1t  ; 
where  PQ Dt  is demand in period t, S  the fixed amount of supply, C  the (constant) cost 
of production, r the discount rate, and T represents the date at which the fixed supply will 
be exhausted. 35  If there is an alternative (“backstop”) resource that provides the same 
services, but available in unlimited quantities at higher cost, B , then the market price 
must reach that level at the moment of exhaustion:  BPT  . 
Once the form of the demand function is specified, the equilibrium can be solved 
numerically with nothing more than a spreadsheet.  We assume a fixed elasticity and 
constant growth over time: 
                                                 
35 Since the cost is constant through time, it is implied that the forces of depletion and technical progress 
negate each other.  The model can be enriched, but this simple form serves our purpose well enough. 
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   ttDt gPKPQ   1 , 
where K is a scaling factor.  To illustrate the impact of underlying economic parameters 
on depletion and prices, we specify three scenarios, as outlined in Table 1.  The “Base 
Case” is calibrated to resemble, at least in broad outline, the world oil market as of year 
2004.  The elasticity and growth rate of oil demand are similar to the historical rate for 
OECD countries.  The cost of the resource is $20 per unit, and if priced at cost, calculated 
demand shows there would be enough supply to last for twenty-three years. 
Parameter Base Case
Burgeoning 
Growth
Resource 
Disappointment High Growth Low Growth
Supply 400 400 300 400 400
Elasticity of Demand -0.35 -0.35 -0.35 -0.35 -0.35
Growth Rate 1.50% 5.00% 1.50% 2.75% 0.50%
Cost 20 20 20 20 20
Discount Rate 10% 10% 10% 10% 10%
Demand Intercept 20 20 20 20 20
Backstop Cost $100 $100 $100 $100 $100
Table 1:  Economic Scenarios
 
 
Because of depletion, however, the market would not price this resource at cost.  
The equilibrium price trajectory starts at $26.61 and rises to $100 (the backstop level) 
over a period of roughly twenty-seven years, as shown in Figure 6a.  Production slowly 
rises, then falls until the resource is finally exhausted and replaced by the backstop.   
The second scenario (“Burgeoning Growth”) allows us to gauge the market’s 
reaction to a sudden change in the expected growth in demand.  Compared to the Base 
Case, the only difference is that the economic growth rate is summarily increased to 5%, 
which is roughly the rate of growth in demand for oil from the developing nations outside 
OECD.  If at time zero (let it be 2004), the old growth outlook were replaced with this 
new information, the market would adjust to ensure that exhaustion does not occur before 
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Figure 6:  The Price Impact of Demand/Supply Surprises 
Figure 6a:  "Base Case" Equilibrium
(elasticity = -0.35, growth = 1.5%)
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Figure 6b:  "Burgeoning Growth" Equilibrium
(elasticity = -0.35, growth = 5%)
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Figure 6c:  "Resource Disappointment" Equilibrium
(elasticity = -0.35, growth = 1.5%, pessimistic)
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the backstop has become economical.  Despite this sudden surge in anticipated growth, 
however, the initial price (in 2004) rises only modestly (see Figure 6b), from $26.61 to 
$31.71 (19%).  Something more than the sudden realization of Chinese growth prospects, 
something quite extraordinary in fact, would be required to produce a doubling or tripling 
of the initial price under these presumed parameters.   
Might that extraordinary factor lie on the supply side?  Since certain observers 
have recently contended that a portion of Saudi Arabia’s reported oil reserves are 
illusory,36 we must consider that possibility.  The third scenario (“Resource 
Disappointment”) is provided to gauge the market impact of the sudden loss of a 
substantial portion of perceived supply—one-fourth of the entire remaining resource base 
in this case.  How would the market react to such news?  As in the case of a sudden 
perceived change in demand, the market reaction to the disappearance of reserves is 
modest (see Figure 6c), prices rising by only 15% (from $26.61 to $30.64).   
Although our model of equilibrium price adjustments is highly stylized, it reveals 
something very genuine about the market process:  adjustments to new information are 
spread across time, rather than being concentrated at the moment of “Eureka!”  
Immediate and dramatic change is costly, costlier in fact than pushing off to the future 
much of the adjustment that will eventually be required.  We are therefore left in search 
of a different explanation for what has occurred lately in the world oil market.   
The Portents of Peak Oil 
 In 1956, M. King Hubbert advanced a novel approach to forecast the date at 
which oil production would enter an inexorable decline.  The method is based on the 
                                                 
36 See Simmons (2005) for a pessimistic view of Saudi Arabian reserves that has triggered much debate.  
The main issues in dispute are summarized by King (2008). 
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logistic curve.  Many economists are familiar with the use of logistic curves to model the 
impact of prices and other incentives on consumer choice.  Hubbert’s idea was that, in the 
case of oil production, prices and other incentives were superfluous; it was all a matter of 
time.  The resulting model of production behaves like a ballistic missile, first rising, then 
falling of its own accord.  The method is entirely empirical, with no theoretical grounding 
in either geology, engineering, or economics.  Hubbert himself refereed to the technique 
as an “extrapolation.”37 
The so-called “Hubbert curve” might have been forgotten altogether but for the 
fact that Hubbert’s 1956 prediction (reproduced here as Figure 7) that U.S. oil production 
would peak around 1970 was famously borne out.  It should also be noted (but usually is 
not) that the predicted volume of oil to be produced at the peak was 37% too low, and 
that Hubbert’s predictions regarding coal and natural gas ran badly amiss.38  Extensive  
 
Figure 7:  Hubbert’s Curve 
 
                                                 
37 Hubbert (1956, p. 21). 
38 Hubbert predicted that U.S. oil production would peak at 3 billion barrels per year; actual production in 
1970 was 4.1 billion barrels.  Hubbert predicted that U.S. gas production would peak at 14 trillion cubic 
feet per year in 1973; actual production was 20 trillion cubic feet in 2007.  Hubbert predicted that global 
coal production will peak in 2150 at about 6.4 billion metric tonnes; actual production reached that level in 
2007 and is still growing rapidly.  Actual production data are from the EIA. 
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testing by Brandt (2007) and Nehring (2007a-c), who applied this technique to many 
petroleum basins around the world, indicates that the Hubbert curve is a very poor 
predictor of the time shape of petroleum extraction, that it finds peaks that do not exist, 
and misses peaks that do.   
Despite its poor track record in predicting actual behavior, the Hubbert curve has 
become influential in certain quarters, and is now widely applied to predict that global oil 
production will soon peak (with cataclysmic effects according to some analysts) if 
corrective actions are not taken.  Consider, for example, this warning from the 
introduction to the well known “Hirsch Report,” a study of peak oil commissioned by the 
U.S. Department of Energy:39   
"The peaking of world oil production presents the U.S. and the world 
with an unprecedented risk management problem. As peaking is 
approached, liquid fuel prices and price volatility will increase 
dramatically, and, without timely mitigation, the economic, social, and 
political costs will be unprecedented.” 
Even if one does believe that oil production will peak in a given year, it is quite 
another thing to assume that catastrophic effects will necessarily follow.  The timing of 
the peak and the nature of its aftermath are not pre-determined by geology; they are 
endogenous manifestations of the inter-temporal allocation of resources as determined by 
market forces.  We demonstrate below that peaking may signal either scarcity or relative 
surplus, rapidly rising prices or constant prices, the near termination of production or its 
mere beginning.  In other words, the phenomenon of peaking in a market-based economy 
is an ambiguous indicator of anything of fundamental importance to the economy.  
Therefore, efforts to date the peak should be of little interest to policymakers or the 
                                                 
39 Hirsch, et. al. (2005, p. 4). 
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public debate.  On the other hand, shouting “fire” in a crowded theater has predictable 
results, whether or not fire exists—so economists can hardly afford to ignore the fuss. 
Therefore, we revisit the economic model of equilibrium depletion considered in 
the previous section.  Beside the Base Case scenario, we now place two more:  High 
Growth and Low Growth, which differ only with respect to the underlying rate of 
economic growth (see Table 1).  Although the change in “fundamentals” is quite small—
well within the range of recent experience—the implications of peak oil change 
profoundly.  In the Base Case, where income grows at 1.5% annually, the peak arrives 
once 36% of the resource has been extracted, leaving 64% available to sustain future 
growth (see Figure 8a).  Beyond the peak, prices rise moderately.  Subject to “High 
Growth,” where income grows at 2.75%, the peak is delayed entirely—production 
collapses at the very end (Figure 8b).  This result is not due to oversight and does not 
signal a problem.  It is, rather, the market’s determination of the extraction path that 
maximizes social welfare.40  And with arrival of the peak in the High Growth scenario, 
prices cease their ascent.  Compare that to the “Low Growth” scenario, where income 
grows at 0.5%, in which case the peak arrives immediately and production is all downhill 
(Figure 8c).  In that case, 100% of the resource remains to be exploited after the peak 
arrives.   
The purpose of these simple exercises is not to predict the future, but to place the 
discussion of peak oil in the context of a market economy where it belongs.  Admittedly, 
the model is rudimentary and quite mechanistic; the price elasticity of demand is the only 
parameter that moderates the rate of depletion.  But this limitation means that a more  
                                                 
40 Our focus here is on the impact of resource depletion, therefore we ignore the possibility that 
externalities or other forms of market failure could warrant government intervention. 
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Figure 8:  Predicted Onset and Aftermath of “Peak” Production 
Figure 8a:  "Base Case" Equilibrium
(elasticity = -0.35, growth = 1.5%)
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Figure 8b:  "High Growth" Equilibrium
(elasticity = -0.35, growth = 2.75%)
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Figure 8c:  "Low Growth" Equilibrium
(elasticity = -0.35, growth = 0%)
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realistic analysis that includes such factors as (a) feedbacks from price to exploration and 
discovery of new deposits, (b) technical innovation, (c) endogenously determined 
economic growth rates, and/or (d) incentives for developing unconventional substitutes 
for crude oil will only guarantee that the ambiguity of the peaking phenomenon is so 
much the worse.  The tournament among analysts who attempt to date the peak has 
provided some amusing results, but it is a sideshow, not the main event.  
The crucial fact is that while oil is constantly being “used up” the world is not 
“running out” of oil.  Indeed, Adelman and Watkins (2008) make a strong case that the 
depletable resource paradigm is not empirically relevant.  Since its inception, the oil 
industry has endeavored to replace every barrel extracted from the earth by investing in 
new projects to find and develop additional resources, so far with great success.  Despite 
our having consumed almost 700 billion barrels of crude oil during the past quarter-
century, the volume of remaining proved reserves available to support future production 
has doubled since 1980 and now stands at an all-time high (see Figure 9).  The stock of 
proved reserves has grown even faster than production, which means that the “reserves to 
production ratio” has grown, and that we now extract a smaller fraction of remaining  
Figure 9:  Global Proved Reserves of Crude Oil
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reserves each year than previously.  The implication is undeniable:  increasing physical 
scarcity, the currency of the peak oil club, can not have triggered oil’s recent ascent.   
Spikes and Speculators 
 Soaring prices have triggered drastic proposals to curb speculative trading in the 
oil markets.  Various restrictions have been proposed by elected officials, who may be 
seeking political cover rather than substantive change, but similar ideas have bubbled up 
from more surprising quarters—including industry insiders.41  Before settling on a 
particular solution to the problem of speculation, however, we should examine two 
central questions:  What should be the role of speculators in a market economy?  What 
has been the impact of speculators in the oil market?   
 Most economists regard the first question as being fairly easy.  Ordinarily, 
freedom to speculate (i.e., to buy or sell an asset because its price is expected to change) 
is fundamental to the efficient operation and stability of markets.  Limiting speculation 
impairs the flow of information needed to maintain equilibrium and achieve allocative 
efficiency.  Markets that are subject to the greatest fundamental volatility in supply and 
demand stand to benefit most from the activities of speculators.  Speculation is not price 
manipulation, but is sometimes used to exploit efforts to manipulate prices by other 
means.  In such cases, it is the manipulation of prices that is objectionable (and usually 
illegal), not speculation, per se.   
The second question is difficult because it is impossible to actually measure the 
extent of speculation.  Most analyses focus on the futures market and distinguish 
                                                 
41 See, for example, Talley and Meyer (2008). 
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“commercial” and “non-commercial” traders.42  Commercial traders are companies 
whose business is naturally exposed to the risk of oil price fluctuations, like oil 
producers, refiners, the airlines, etc.  These companies can hedge their risks by taking 
certain positions in the futures market, which stabilizes cash flow and does not constitute 
speculation.  On the other hand, non-commercial traders (e.g., banks, pensions, and hedge 
funds) are companies who lack natural exposure to oil price movements, have no 
incentive to hedge, and whose positions should be counted as speculation.  In theory. 
In practice, many commercial traders speculate (which has spawned the term 
“hedgulator”) and many non-commercial traders hedge.43  Simply counting the volume of 
open interest held by each category reveals very little about the extent of “speculation.” 
The problem goes deeper, of course, because what reformers really want to 
identify (and eliminate) is “destabilizing speculation,” which refers to speculators who 
buy (or sell) when the price is already too high (or low).  The impracticality of this 
“reform” is revealed by the fact that, for every transaction involving a destabilizing 
speculator, there must be either a hedger or a stabilizing speculator on the other side.  By 
construction, the two are always equal.  To eliminate destabilizing speculation would 
require eliminating intermediaries, hedgers, and the futures market altogether.   
Is it possible that price fixing, rather than speculation per se, has elevated oil 
prices to unprecedented levels?  With respect to OPEC, this has already been answered:  
OPEC does engage in price fixing.  Oil prices would be lower today if OPEC had not 
                                                 
42 See, for example, US CFTC (2008). 
43 Commercial traders tend to speculate, rather than hedge, when they hold particularly strong views about 
future market movements.  Many non-commercial traders are financial intermediaries who provide risk 
management services to commercial traders.  By so doing, the intermediaries acquire natural exposure to 
price risk, some of which may be laid off by hedging in the futures market.  Other intermediaries are 
categorized as non-commercial traders even though they have acquired substantial petroleum operations of 
their own.  See Davis (2008). 
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previously restricted investment in new capacity.  On the other hand, major OPEC 
producers, like Saudi Arabia, must by now feel that prices have gotten too high—placing 
future demand for their long-lived deposits in jeopardy.44 
In fact, there is no evidence of price fixing on the part of anyone else, which 
includes both speculators and the “super-major” oil companies.  It would be a daunting 
proposition to fix the price of the single largest commodity in world trade, something a 
cartel might attempt if it controlled 70% of world reserves, but not something that small 
fry could achieve.  Relative to the size of the world oil market, hedge funds and the 
“super-major” oil companies are indeed small fry.  To succeed at price fixing, one of two 
things would be required:  (1) accumulating large private inventories that are diverted 
from the commercial supply chain; or (2) shutting in a significant portion of global oil 
production.  Neither phenomenon has been observed.45   
Conclusion 
 Although we argue that the world oil market operates subject to the familiar laws 
of supply and demand and is therefore amenable to economic analysis, we can not say 
what will come next.  The fundamental determinants of price will continue to be highly 
volatile, and demand and supply will remain inelastic.  The range of plausible prices is 
therefore broad, especially in the short-run. 
Having declined to make a specific prediction, however, we would not rule out 
the possibility that soaring oil prices were triggered by an unwarranted perception of 
scarcity, and possibly accelerated by elastic expectations and overtrading in the manner 
                                                 
44 For a discussion of Saudi concern over high prices, see Mouawad (2008) and The Economist (2008b). 
45 Commercial stocks of petroleum in the U.S. and OECD were essentially unchanged between 2003 and 
2008, while global oil production increased.  Source: EIA Short Term Energy Outlook, August 2008, Table 
3a. 
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of many previous commodity bubbles.  Although it is to be hoped that freely functioning 
markets would never exhibit such instability, it is not an uncommon result—as Charles 
Kindleberger’s survey of historical manias amply demonstrates.46 
Explanations for bubbles may range from animal spirits and herd mentality to 
more rational factors like differential information.47  In the particular case of a depletable 
resource, however, there is a specific dynamic to the equilibrium that might threaten 
stability, as Robert Solow pointed out in his 1974 Presidential Address to the AEA.48  
Inter-temporal allocation imposes two conditions (stock and flow) on the equilibrium:  
(1) the net price must rise at the rate of interest, and (2) the price level must be just high 
enough to extinguish demand when the resource is finally exhausted.  If for any reason 
the price begins to rise too rapidly, and producers extrapolate that to the future, they may 
be tempted by capital gains to shut-in production and withhold current supply.  That 
reaction would create additional upward pressure on the current price and push the 
market farther away from equilibrium.  Concrete evidence of the glut that would 
inevitably result arrives only in the long run.  In the short run elastic expectations could 
produce a bubble. 
Even if this view of the market is correct, which seems likely, we still lack a 
definite answer to the inevitable question:  “what next?”  As Professor Kindleberger 
would remind us: “The period of distress may be drawn out over weeks, months, even 
years, or it may be concentrated into a few days.”49  In other words:  some bubbles pop, 
but others just peter out.   
                                                 
46 Kindleberger (2000). 
47 See Blanchard and Watson (1982), who discuss the scope for “rational bubbles.”  
48 Solow (1974, pp. 6-7). 
49 Kindleberger (2000, p. 91). 
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